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Financial Services Agency

Year 2000Regulated by government

The Financial Services Agency (FSA) oversees all financial services providers, including Forex brokers, in Japan. The ultimate aim of Japan's FSA is to maintain the country’s financial system and ensure its stability. It is also responsible for protecting security investors, insurance policyholders, and depositors. It achieves its aims in a number of different ways including planning and policy making, supervising financial services providers, overseeing securities transactions, and inspecting financial institutions in the private sector. When the FSA was first created it was merely an administrative body. However, its responsibilities were widened in 2001 when it became the external representative of the Cabinet Office of Japan. It took over the responsibilities of the Financial Reconstruction Committee, and also took over responsibility for failed financial institutions.Today, the FSA Japan is held accountable to the Japanese Minister of Finance and enjoys a wide scope of responsibility.

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Sanction Temporarily closed
Disclosure summary
  • Disclosure matching Supervision number matching
  • Disclosure time 2009-03-24
  • Reason for punishment Situation where it is recognized that the management of the electronic information processing system related to the financial instruments business is insufficient
Disclosure details

Administrative action against Rakuten Securities Co., Ltd.

March 24, 2009 Financial Services Agency Rakuten Securities Australia Regarding administrative actions against joint-stock companies Rakuten Securities Australia As a result of an inspection by the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission against a stock company (hereinafter referred to as "our company"), it was found that the following violations of laws and regulations were found. Open in was done. ○ Situation in which it is recognized that the management of the electronic information processing system related to the financial instruments business is insufficient (1) On November 11, 2008, we suspended orders from all customers for about 7 hours, including the first session. and (2) on January 13, 2009, a pre-event for 3,024 customers. This caused a system failure (hereinafter referred to as the "January 13, 2009 failure") that had the effect of delaying orders for a maximum of less than 5 hours, including the system failure. Inadequate preparation of disaster recovery system to prevent damage from spreading or to minimize damage, and appropriate measures are taken to prevent unnecessary confusion for customers in the event of a failure It was accepted that there were none. 1. Failure on November 11, 2008 (1) We will manually restart the process that has stopped during the recovery work of the failure caused by the failure of the database product (hereinafter referred to as the "primary failure"). We instructed the vendor in charge to carry out recovery work, but due to human error during the work, secondary failures such as "suspension of orders for stop-loss orders for Japanese stocks" occurred. The above secondary failures were due to the lack of a double-check system in which the results of such high-risk temporary operations were confirmed by someone other than the vendor in charge. In response to this, it is recognized that this is due to the system not confirming the results, and that there is a deficiency in the system for preventing operational errors. (2) We instructed the vendor in charge to manually start up the system that did not start automatically due to the delay in nighttime batch processing. , some processing failed to start, and secondary failures such as "delayed start of orders for futures and options at the OSE Evening Session" occurred. It is acknowledged that the above secondary failure was caused by the lack of a system to ensure the effectiveness of the manual and the inadequacy of the system for confirming the scope of impact of the failure. (3) At our company, the criteria or guidelines for important decisions such as cancellation of order suspension and login suspension were not specified and clarified in advance. The order suspension and login suspension were lifted without confirming the situation, and as a result, the Company received an order subject to error correction. 2. Failure on January 13, 2009 (1) In February 2008, when the Yokohama and Toyosu data centers were integrated into Toyosu, our company was involved in the important work of setting up the ordering system network. Misconfigurations were overlooked without devising ways to prevent oversights, such as putting a check mark for each item, or checking with evidence, etc., and it is recognized that our system for preventing operational errors is inadequate. (2) Due to the erroneous settings mentioned above, the Company carried out restoration work by transferring orders that had been stuck in the order system, which had been disconnected from the TSE, to the order system that was normally connected. In the failure recovery procedure manual that was issued, the above work case was not assumed, and a considerable amount of time was required for recovery work. (3) At our company, the judgment criteria or judgment guideline for implementing "invalidation processing for orders that have been received/ordered" has not been specified and clarified in advance, so regarding orders that have been corrected or canceled Due to the delay in the determination of invalidation by the Company's Severe System Failure Countermeasures Committee, the customer who placed the order cannot correct or cancel the order until the invalidation process is completed, and the trading capacity of the order is restricted for a considerable period of time. was in a state of being The status of the operation of the above business at our company is based on Article 40, Item 2 of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Law, and Article 123, Item 14 of the Cabinet Office It is recognized that it falls under the situation where it is recognized that the management of the information processing organization is insufficient. In addition, as a major Internet-only securities company, we are required to develop and operate systems with strong fault tolerance and to develop a sufficient system for responding appropriately in the event of a fault. However, in spite of the past two administrative dispositions, large-scale system failures have occurred, and further efforts are required to develop a system that can operate the system stably, including responding to the reasons for the above recommendations. deemed necessary. Based on the above, the following administrative actions were taken against the company today. [Business Suspension Order] From April 1, 2009 (Wednesday) to April 30, 2009 (Thursday), new business development accompanied by system maintenance (excluding those individually approved by the Agency). ) stop. [Business Improvement Order] (1) By verifying past system failure cases, etc., categorize problems in the assumed failure recovery system and take effective countermeasures. (2) Clarify where responsibility lies, including that of the management, considering that this is the third business improvement order due to "a situation in which it is recognized that the management of the electronic information processing system is insufficient." (3) Formulate and implement an improvement plan for each aspect of planning, development, operation, maintenance, etc., in order to build a system that can operate the system stably. (4) When formulating and implementing the improvement plan in (3) above, an external system audit of the entire system shall be conducted to verify the effectiveness of system management, and the system shall be developed based on the results. . (5) To reaffirm the importance of system management to officers and employees, and to implement the necessary system maintenance and training, etc., in order to ensure an appropriate business operation system. (6) Regarding (1) to (5) above, by Thursday, April 23, 2009 (Regarding (3) and (4) above, the progress status after the same day will be announced on June 30, 2009) by (Tuesday) and every three months thereafter), and from time to time as necessary, in writing.
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